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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
BRIEF OF APPELLEES

vs
DAVID SIMMONS and
PATRICIA KAY SIMMONS,

Case No. 920800-CA

Defendants/Appellees.

JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction by virtue of Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-18a-l(2) (e) and § 78-2a-3 (2) (e) (Supp. 1993).
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the search warrant in this case was served

"in the night" within the meaning of §77-23-5, Utah Code Ann. (1953)
The trial court's factual finding on this question is reviewed by
this Court under a clearly erroneous standard.

State v. Bobo, 803

P.2d 1268 (Utah App. 1990).
2.

Whether the failure of the search warrant affidavit

to set forth specific facts justifying a nighttime search should
result in the exclusion of evidence seized pursuant to the search
warrant. This
correctness.
App. 1992).

Court reviews a trial court's legal conclusions for
Stewart v. State es rel. Deland, 830 P.2d 306 (Utah

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
U.S. Const. Amendment IV [Unreasonable Searches
and Seizures]: The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.
STATUTE
Utah Code Ann. §77-23-5. Time for Service - Officer may request assistance.
(1) The magistrate must insert a direction in
the warrant that it be served in the daytime,
unless the affidavits or oral testimony state
a reasonable cause to believe a search is necessary in the night to seize the property prior to
it being concealed, destroyed, damaged or altered, or for other good reason; in which case
he may insert a direction that it may be served
any time of the day or night. An officer may
request other persons to assist him in conducting the search.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is a criminal prosecution against the Defendant/
Appellees for possession of a controlled substance with the intent
to distribute within 1000 feet of a child care facility in violation of §58-37-8(1).
Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below
The Defendant/Appellees were charged with possession of
a controlled substance, marijuana, with intent to distribute within

1000 feet of a child care facility or with a person younger than
eighteen years. After a preliminary hearing both defendants were
bound over for trial in the district court (R. 1). The defendants
filed a pre-trial motion to suppress all evidence seized pursuant
to the execution of a search warrant on their residence on January
20, 1992 (R. 40). After a hearing the motion to suppress was granted (R. 74). Proposed findings were submitted and objected to by
the State (R. 67, 69), and a second hearing on the objections, and
to consider the intervening Supreme Court decision in State v. Rowe, 196
Utah Adv. Rep. 14

(Utah 9/28/92), was held (R. 82). After the se-

cond hearing the trial court reaffirmed its initial decision to suppress the evidence (R. 82), and the State took this interlocutory
appeal (R. 117).
Statement of Facts
On January 20, 1992, Roy City police officer Carl Merino
applied to the Circuit Court for a search warrant to search the residence of Defendants (R. 38). The affidavit in support of the application contained no specific facts to support the application for
night execution, but instead made only generalized statements applicable to all drug cases and based only on the affiant's general conclusions (R. 40). Nonetheless, nighttime authority was included in
the resulting search warrant (R. 43), which was executed that same
date at 6:30 p.m. (R. 83). The parties stipulated that the sun set
at 5:29 p.m. on that day (R. 83). Upon executing the search warrant
the officers found and seized the evidence upon which this prosecution was initiated.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The trial court properly concluded that this search

warrant was executed "in the night" within the statutory meaning.
In the circumstances of this case, where the warrant was executed
one hour after sunset in the winter, the trial judge's conclusion
that night had fallen was not clearly erroneous.
2.

The exclusionary rule was properly applied to the

evidence seized
warrant.

as a result of the execution of the defective search

The decision of the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Rowe,

196 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (Utah 1992) , relied upon the existence in that
case of a valid arrest warrant which afforded an alternative lawful
justification for the executing officers' presence in the place
searched.
ARGUMENT
POINT I:

THE FINDING BY THE TRIAL COURT THAT THIS WARRANT WAS
EXECUTED "IN THE NIGHT" WAS NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
Unless the trial court's finding of fact that the search

warrant in this case was executed "in the nighttime" was clearly
erroneous,

it should not be disturbed.

1268 (Utah App. 1990) at 1271-2.

State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d

The trial court's findings are

"clearly erroneous" only if they are in conflict with the clear
weight of the evidence, State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880 (Utah App.
1990), cert, den. 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990), or if the appellate
court has a "definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made,"

State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987).

The factual basis in this record for the trial courtfs
finding of "nighttime" is the parties' stipulation that the search
warrant was executed at 6:30 p.m. on a midwinter day when the sun
had set an hour earlier at 5:29 p.m.

Only these facts exist on the

recordr and it is clear that the trial judge reached the finding of
"nighttime" in one or both of the following ways:
1.

That common sense would dictate that darkness had
descended an hour after sunset on a late January day,
and that darkness was a sufficient basis to conclude
that the warrant was served "in the night;" or

2.

That the word "night" in the statute should be defined
as the period between sunset and sunrise.

There are no Utah cases defining "nighttime" for the purpose
of searches, State v. Purser, 828 P.2d 515 (Utah App. 1992), and the
statute itself is silent on this point.

There is, however, ample

authority to support the trial court's conclusion that actual darkness
constitutes "night."

See, e.g., State v. Burnside, 741 P.2d 352 (Idaho

1987), holding that unless there is sufficient natural light to
distinguish a person's features, it is "night."

In State v. Holman,

424 N.W.2d 627 (Neb. 1988), where the daytime warrant was executed
at 8:00 p.m. on a day (March 31) on which it was stipulated the sun
had set at 6:47 p.m., the court, holding that "daytime" extends from
dawn to darkness, reversed the trial court's denial of a motion to
suppress.

The darkness standard is also adopted in Kuenzel v. State,

577 So.2d 474 (Ala. Cr. App. 1990). Although the record in this case
does not expressly describe darkness, the only logical inference that
may be drawn from the stipulation is that it was in fact dark when this

warrant was executed, because on a midwinter day it will be dark
long before an hour has passed since the sun has set.
The only other logical conclusion the trial judge could
have reached, that "night" is the period between sunset and sunrise,
is equally sound.

It is a fundamental rule of construction that

statutory terms which are not specifically defined are to be taken
in the sense in which they are understood in common language. State
v. Holman, supra, at 628. Virtually every reputable dictionary consulted gives as the preferred definition of "night," the "period
between sunset and sunrise."
Dictionary (2d ed. 1979).

Webster's New Universal Unabridged

This division of time between day and

night on the basis of sunset and sunrise is a universally accepted
and commonly understood concept.
The State urges this Court to define "night" in our statute by adopting Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(h), which
defines "daytime" as the period from 6:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m.

Such

an arbitrary definition would effectively condone the execution of
"daytime only" search warrants during the several hours each day of
total darkness which fall within the specified hours during the
winter.

In light of the historical recognition that the search of

a dwelling after darkness has fallen is even more invasive than one
during daylight, State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730 (Utah App. 1991) at 73839 and n. 10, 11 at 739, the adoption of such an arbitrary standard
would therefore destroy the clear legislative intent to distinguish
such searches.

POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED THE EVIDENCE SEIZED
UPON THE EXECUTION OF THIS DEFECTIVE SEARCH WARRANT.
The State concedes that this search warrant was defective
because the supporting affidavit lacked the requisite factual specificity to authorize nighttime entry.

Brief of Appellant at 5 n. 2.

This case is thus factually identical with State v. Rowe, 196 Utah Adv.
Rep. 14 (Utah 1992), where the Supreme Court reversed a decision of
this Court which had applied the exclusionary rule to evidence seized
with a nighttime warrant which was defective in the same way as that
in the present case.

State v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730 (Utah Ct. App. 1991),

rev'd, 196 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (Utah 1992).
The disposition of this appeal depends on the proper interpretation of the Supreme Court decision in Rowe II, where the Supreme
Court said:
"We have previously held that suppression
of evidence is an appropriate remedy for illegal police conduct only when that conduct
implicates a fundamental violation of a defendant's rights, (citing State v. Fixel, 744
P.2d 1366 [Utah 1 9 8 7 ] ) . . . .
Under the facts of this case, we conclude
that the violation of section 77-23-5 did not
implicate defendant's fundamental rights. . . .
It is of particular significance that in
addition to the search warrant for Swickey's
apartment, the officers carried a valid warrant for Swickey's arrest. . . The officers'
entry into the apartment during nighttime
hours and without notice, although not properly authorized by the search warrant, was properly authorized by the warrant for Swickey's
arrest. . . Inasmuch as the officers made lawful entry onto the premises and had general
authority to secure those premises plus a valid warrant to search the premises during the
daylight, the improperly authorized execution

of that search during the nighttime constitutes a minimal intrusion on interests
protected by the Fourth Amendment." 196
Utah Adv. Rep. at 15-16 (emphasis added).
Contrary to the assertion in the State's brief that Rowe
II stands for the proposition that a violation of §77-23-5 is always
procedural only, and never implicates a defendant's fundamental
rights, the above language makes it clear that the particular facts
of Rowe II compelled the conclusion in that case only.
Court carefully confined

its holding

The Supreme

to the facts of that case,

and expressly tied its conclusion that the violation in that case
did not involve a fundamental right to the existence of a valid arrest warrant for one of the occupants of the dwelling.

The concur-

ring opinion of Justice Durham (joined by Justice Zimmerman) emphasizes this point. Rowe II, supra, at 16.
It is Appellees' position that because the police in this
case, unlike Rowe II, did not simultaneously possess a valid arrest
warrant for an occupant of the residence, the violation of §77-23-5
involved a fundamental right under the Fourth Amendment, and the
trial court therefore properly applied the exclusionary rule.

Under

this analysis, the showing of bad faith or prejudice which the State
suggests

becomes immaterial, since these factors come into play only

if a violation does not "implicate a fundamental violation of a defendant's rights."

The violation in this case involved a fundamental

right; indeed, the particularized requirements for nighttime searches
may even be a "constitutional imperative." Rowe I,
739.

supra, n. 11 at

CONCLUSION
The trial court's finding that this search warrant was
executed at "night" was based upon the parties1 stipulation that
the warrant was served at 6:30 p.m. on a winter day when the sun
had set an hour earlier at 5:29 p.m.

The lower court reached this

conclusion either through a common sense deduction that darkness had
fallen and that it was therefore "night/1 or that "night" includes
the period from sunset to sunrise.

The former proposition cannot

be said to be "clearly erroneous" under the relevant test, and the
latter legal conclusion, given the universally accepted definition
of "night," is supported by rules of statutory construction and
decisional law.
The Supreme Court decision in Rowe II does not hold that
the violation of the nighttime requirements of §77-23-5 never implicates a fundamental right of a defendant; the Rowe II opinion
carefully confines its holding to the specific facts in that case,
where a valid arrest warrant provided an alternative lawful means
of entry into the residence.

No such alternative exists to justify

the nighttime search in this case, and the exclusionary rule was
therefore properly invoked by the trial court.
The trial court's suppression of the evidence should be
affirmed.

CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, two copies
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Attorney General, attorney for Appellant, 236 State Capitol Bldg.,
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR BOX ELDER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/
-

vs

FINDINGS AND ORDER ON DEFENDANTS1 MOTION TO SUPPRESS

-

DAVID SIMMONS and
PATRICIA KAY SIMMONS,

Criminal Nos. 921000014
921000015

Defendants•

The Defendants' Motion to Suppress came before the Court
for hearing on August 3, 1992, and for rehearing on October 19, 1992;
defendants were each present with counsel and the State was represented by Jon J. Bunderson, Box Elder County Attorney.

A written

Motion to Suppress evidence in these cases was previously filed
and supporting Memoranda were filed by both parties.
a Supplemental Memorandum herein.

The State filed

The parties stipulated that the

search warrant in these cases was executed at 6:30 p.m. on January
20, 1992 and that the sun set at 5:29 p.m. that day.

The Court,

having heard the arguments and representations of counsel and having considered the Memoranda in support of and opposition to the
motion, and being otherwise fully advised herein, the Court now
makes the following findings:
1. That the search warrant in these cases was executed
in the nighttime.
2.

That the affidavit in support of the BpaTfeHatorr^nf

alleges no specific facts justifying a nighttime search as required by §77-23-5(1), Utah Code Ann., but rather alleges matters
based upon the affiant's general knowledge and experience in drug
cases.
3. Because there is no evidence before the Court that
the officers who executed the search warrant in this case had in
their possession a valid warrant for the arrest of any person within
the premises searched, the procedural defect in failing to include
sufficient grounds for nighttime entry, and the nighttime execution
of this search warrant, amounted to a fundamental violation of the
Defendants1 rights requiring suppression of the evidence seized
pursuant to the search warrant.

State v. Fixel, 744 P.2d 1366 (Utah

1987); State v. Rowe, 196 Utah Adv. Rep. 14 (Utah 1992).
Based upon the foregoing findings, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
that all evidence seized pursuant to the execution of the search
warrant in these cases, and the fruits of all such eyi^ence, be,
and the same are hereby suppressed.
DATED this jo day of CnJLubei, 199
BY THE COURT^
;.vJttDKINS
First District Judge
FORM AND CONTENT APPROVED
ANB-€e££==BECE#VED:
BUNDERSON
Elder County Attorney

